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Abstract
Though the existing literature provides evidence that married women choose short com-
mutes because of low wages and household responsibilities, this theoretical paper shows that
wives employed in highly paid positions also undertake short commutes and endogenously
choose longer times for housework. In contrast, middle-class wives choose long commutes
and undertake limited household chores. The results suggest that the commute times of
wives follow a backward-bending pattern and there is a tradeo⁄ between commute time and
the hours devoted to housework in terms of wage rates. Using a sample of married women
working full time from the 1993 Japanese Panel Survey of Consumers, we obtain empirical
evidence supporting these predictions.
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11 Introduction
In most countries, domestic chores remain the primary responsibility of many married women,
even though they are often also in full-time employment. In this situation, married women
will reduce their commute times in order to do housework. The monetary value assigned to
time-saving in commuting is then an important factor when married women make decisions on
their residential and employment locations. In this regard, this paper o⁄ers both theoretical
and empirical evidence on how married women change their commute times in response to wage
changes, when considering the endogeneity of housework time.
Kain (1962) empirically shows that females make shorter journeys to work than their hus-
bands. White (1977) and Madden (1981) present theoretical location models to explain these
results. Women select jobs closer to their residence because lower female earnings and shorter
work hours reduce the motivation to commute. Women￿ s heavy burden of household responsibil-
ities also raises the cost of commuting. Gender di⁄erences in commute times are also considered
by Freedman and Kern (1997), Hanson and Hanson (1980), Johnston-Anumonwo (1992), Lee
and McDonald (2003), Madden and Chen Chiu (1990), Mok (2007), Singell and Lillydahl (1986),
and Turner and Niemeier (1997).
Most of these studies ignore the role of women￿ s wage rates in decisions about the location
of households. If there is less spatial variation in women￿ s wages, women have less reason to
commute and their work trips become shorter. This explanation is particularly applicable to
part-time workers, because they face less spatial variation in wages at low-wage levels. Full-time
workers, however, encounter greater spatial variation in wages than part-time workers. Married
women who work full time will simultaneously determine both their workplace and residence
(Madden and Chen Chiu 1990). If wives choose higher-wage jobs, then their commute times
may become as long as their husbands￿(Shingell and Lillydahl 1986, Lee and McDonald 2003).
However, wealthy households also tend to live closer to city centers, because the higher the wages
of women, the greater the opportunity cost of commuting in lost leisure time. Furthermore,
women￿ s household responsibilities limit their willingness to commute. Therefore, households
may o⁄set the e⁄ects of long commutes by wives by locating their residences nearer to the wife￿ s
2place of employment (Freedman and Kern 1997). For instance, Mok (2007) uses a sample of full-
time workers to show that the location decisions of dual-income households are more sensitive to
the wife￿ s earnings than the husband￿ s. This suggests the importance of considering the relation
between married women￿ s commute times and their wage rates in more detail. For this reason,
this paper casts light on di⁄erences in commute times among married women working full time.
Previous studies have considered the time spent on housework as a given, and even though
they argued for its impact on commute time, they were not treated as interdependent. We
use a traditional labor￿ leisure model because it endogenously determines the time spent on
housework. Solberg and Wong (1992) analyze a household model where the time use for each
person is divided into market work, home production, leisure, and work-related travel time.
However, the latter is treated as predetermined. In contrast to Solberg and Wong (1992), we
consider a model where married women simultaneously decide their commute and housework
hours.
Using this theoretical model, we ￿nd that there is a case where the e⁄ect of wives￿wage
rates on their commute times follows a backward-bending (inverse C-shaped) pattern. That
is, married women￿ s commute times ￿rst increase with respect to the wage rate, then decline.
Increasing wages also decreases housework hours in Solberg and Wong￿ s (1992) model. However,
if we assume, as in Kohara (2000), that commute time is associated with a loss of energy to
devote to housework, the housework time of married women follows a C-shaped pattern. Here
we observe a tradeo⁄ between commute time and housework time in relation to the wage rate.
Our data set, drawn from the 1993 Japanese Panel Survey of Consumers (JPSC) conducted
by the Institute for Research on Household Economics, divides time use into commuting, market
work, housework, and leisure. Using a sample of married women working full time, we regress
each category of time use on monthly wage rates and their squares, subject to total time restric-
tions. The empirical results con￿rm the earlier theoretical predictions. We must consider that
our empirical model has a potential endogeneity problem: that is, wage rates are determined
in the labor market. Singell and Lillydahl (1986) estimate a two-stage least squares model that
simultaneously decides the wage rate and time use functions to control for endogeneity. This
3paper uses the instrumental variables (IV) method. We again ￿nd that married women￿ s com-
mute times follow an inverse C-shaped pattern and that the time spent on housework is inversely
related to commute time with respect to wage rates. We also ￿nd that ordinary least squares
(OLS) underestimates the e⁄ect of wage rates when compared with the IV method.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present a theoretical
model of married women￿ s behavior. The data and empirical model used are discussed in Section
3, along with the empirical results. Section 4 summarizes the main conclusions of the paper and
gives directions for future research.
2 The model
In this model, we cast light on the in￿ uence of wage rates on the commute time of wives. We do
not consider gender di⁄erences in commute time, thus the commuting decisions of husbands are
degenerated outside the model. A married woman is assumed to have the following three options.
The ￿rst option is that she may work and reside in the suburb. Employment opportunities are
also o⁄ered in the city center. We assume that city center ￿rms o⁄er higher wage rates to married
woman than the suburban ￿rms. Let ￿w > 0 be the di⁄erence between a wage rate in the city
center and the suburb, where w is a wage rate. The second option is that she may undertake this
opportunity and thereby work in the city center and reside in the suburb, commuting regularly
to work. The third option is that she may work and reside in the city center. She chooses
the option that generates the highest utility, i.e., max fU1;U2;U3g, where Ui (i = 1;2;3) is the
utility level of the i-th option. In our model, commute time is given in each option as follows:
ti =
￿
￿ t (i = 1;3)
t(w) (i = 2)
A married women becomes a short commuter when she chooses option 1 or option 3. Otherwise,
she is a long commuter. The married women chooses option 2 as a result of wage increases. Thus,
the time spent on commuting in option 2 depends on wage rates, where ￿t=￿w = tw > ￿ t > 0.
Because the married woman can choose only one of the three options, travel time is endogenously
determined in our model. Note that the commuting time decision is a discrete choice. In
addition, we implicitly assume in our model that the married woman￿ s bargaining power in
4the household increases when her wage rate increases because she can then choose residential
location.
Now we consider the utility maximization problem of the i-th option. We present a formal
model of the time allocation of married women in the manner of Gronau (1977), which assumes
that time use for each person is divided into three basic activities￿ market work m, home
production h, and leisure l. In this paper, however, the basic activity is extended to include
the time spent on commuting, as in Solberg and Wong (1992). We also assume throughout the
paper that the household consumes a single unit of housing. A woman is considered to have the
following well-behaved and quasi-concave utility function:
Ui = U(l;X);
where l represents leisure time and X a composite good. The quantity of X consumed by the
married woman is given by X = Xm +Xh, where Xm is goods purchased in the market and Xh
is goods produced at home. The quantity of market goods is given by:
Xm = wm + R + I ￿ ci;
where R is the nonlabor income of the wife, I is the sum of the labor and nonlabor income of
her husband, and ci is the housing (rental) cost. We assume that R and I are exogenously given.
We also assume that the pecuniary commuting cost is zero. Employers often pay the pecuniary
commuting cost in Japan (Yamaga 2000). The housing (rental) cost ci is given by:
ci =
￿
￿ c (i = 1;2)
c(w) (i = 3)
The housing cost is constant ￿ c when married women dwell in the suburbs. We assume that
the housing cost in the city center is higher than in the suburb. A woman chooses option 3
because of the wage increase. Thus, the housing cost in option 3 depends on wage rates, where
￿c=￿w = cw > ￿ c > 0. Similarly to Kohara (2000), in our model the quantity of home goods is
given by:
Xh = A(ti)F(h);
where F(￿) is the home production function and A(￿) is a shift parameter function of productivity
that depends on ti. For all h, F(h) exhibits positive and diminishing marginal products. If
5At = 0, the model is similar to Gronau (1977) and Solberg and Wong (1992). Kohara (2000),
however, assumes that women who spend time commuting have less energy for housework, thus
reducing their productivity, i.e., At < 0.
The married woman faces the following two constraints: the income constraint,
X = wm + R + I ￿ ci + A(ti)F(h); (1)
and the time constraint,
T = l + h + m + ti; (2)
where T is the total time available.
The ￿rst-order conditions for the maximization problem in option i include the following:




In our model, the married woman chooses option 1 when she receives a low wage. She obtains
a higher wage rate when she chooses options 2 or 3. She will then choose the city center job
opportunity if her utility becomes higher. To investigate this, we calculate the response of utility









(i = 2;3): (5)































D = (Zw ￿ Y )AFhh < 0:
Substituting Eqs. (6) and (7) into Eq. (5), and using Eq. (4), we obtain:
￿U2
￿w
= (m ￿ tw(w ￿ AtF)): (9)
Eq. (9) investigates the utility level of option 2 compared with the utility level of option 1. The
wife is then more likely to choose option 2 than option 1 when her working time is long, when
the additional opportunity cost of commuting is low, and when the loss of goods produced at
home is small.



















Substituting Eqs. (10) and (11) into Eq. (5), and using Eq. (4), we obtain:
￿U3
￿w
= (m ￿ cw): (13)
Eq. (13) investigates the size of the utility level of option 3 compared with the utility level of
option 1. The wife is then more likely to choose option 3 than option 1 when her working time
is long and the additional housing cost in the city center is low.
If m is su¢ ciently small, and if both Eqs. (9) and (13) become negative, then the married
woman resides and works in the suburb. She receives a low wage and commutes for a short time.
This case is applicable to part-time workers. Because we wish to cast light on the situation of
married women employed full time, we consider the case where m is su¢ ciently large and both
7Eqs. (9) and (13) become positive. The married woman then chooses options 2 or 3 when she









+ AtF ? w: (14)
Consider At = 0. The equation is easier to understand in this case. Under At = 0, option 2
is attractive to a married woman when the wage rate is lower than the ratio of the additional
housing cost to the additional travel time. That is, for the married woman the additional
housing cost is too high and the opportunity cost of travel time is su¢ ciently low. The married
woman then commutes for a long time because she retains her residence in the suburb. Option
3, however, is attractive to her in the reverse case. If her wage rate is high, she then feels that
the additional housing cost is su¢ ciently low and the opportunity cost of travel time is too high.
She thus transfers her residence to the city center. In sum, when the wage rate starts at a low
level and then increases, she is more likely to choose a long commute time. However, when the
wage starts at a high level and then increases, she is more likely to choose a short commute time.
The entire schedule therefore bends backwards (inverse C-shaped) when we place the commute
time on the horizontal axis and the wage rate on the vertical axis.1
Lastly, we consider the housework time of married women. We ￿nd that an increase in
the wage rate reduces housework time in both Eqs. (8) and (12). When wage rates rise, it is
more attractive to work in the market than at home to obtain consumer goods. If At = 0, the
reduction in housework in option 2 is equal to that in option 3. The married woman, however,
further reduces her housework time in option 2 when At < 0. That is, she is too tired to do
housework because of her long commute. We may then observe that a short commuter with
a higher wage (option 3) will have longer housework time than a long commuter with a lower
wage (option 2) if the productivity loss in housework is su¢ ciently large in option 2. Because
a short commuter with a lower wage in option 1 has a longer housework time than the long
commuter with the higher wage in option 2, the entire schedule of housework time follows a
C-shaped pattern when we place housework time on the horizontal axis and the wage rate on
1Placing the wage rate on the vertical axis is customary in economics. Of course, the entire schedule becomes
inverse U-shaped when we place the wage rate on the horizontal axis.
8the vertical axis. Therefore, we observe that the time spent on housework is inversely related to
commute time with respect to wage rates.
3 Empirical analysis
3.1 Data and empirical speci￿cation
The data employed in the estimation are from the JPSC. This survey began in 1993 with
interviews of 1500 women, aged 24 to 34 years. One advantage of this survey is that it includes
individual wages and time allocations on weekdays, comprising commute, housework, labor, and
leisure times. In the theoretical part of the paper, we assume that commute time is a discrete
variable and married women have only two options: either a short or long commute. In the
empirical part, however, we consider commute time as a continuous variable, because the time
allocations for weekdays in the JPSC are recorded in 10-minute intervals. We also note that
in the 1993 wave, individual wage rates were reported; after 1993, they were reformulated as
categorical data. Accordingly, even though the JPSC provides panel data, we focus on the 1993
wave because we can use the continuous variable for wage rates to con￿rm our hypotheses.
The sample used in the analysis is as follows. First, we removed observations on unmarried
respondents because our focus is on the commute times of married women. Second, as discussed
earlier, we consider only full-time workers. In the 1993 JPSC, full-time workers reported a
monthly salary. The monthly salary is suitable for considering the relation between wage rates
and commute times, because the statistical variability of the monthly salary is relatively large.
Third, we dropped all observations where the necessary information was not available. After
screening the data in this manner, we obtained a sample of 128 observations.
Table 1 presents the de￿nitions and Table 2 shows the summary statistics of the dependent
variables: commute time, housework time, market working time, and leisure time. Table 1
also provides de￿nitions of the independent variables used in the regression analysis. The most
important variable that we focus on is wage rates. We also include a quadratic speci￿cation
of wage rates, because we hypothesize that the commute time of married women follows a
backward-bending pattern. Figure 1 plots data on the commute time and the monthly wage.
9Initially we ￿nd that wage rates and commute times have a positive correlation. Consider Figure
1 in more detail. On the one hand, there are long commuters whose earnings are between 200,000
and 250,000 yen. On the other hand, married women who earn about 300,000 yen or more have
shorter commute times than the former. Therefore, Figure 1 may reveal that commute time is
negatively related to wage rate in this range.
The empirical speci￿cation is determined as follows. First, each time-use equation is esti-
mated by OLS.2 Because the total time available for each person equals 1440 minutes (24 hours),
the sum of the partial e⁄ects of changes in each explanatory variable (except the constant term)
automatically equals zero for each set of time-use equations. This implies a tradeo⁄ in time use.
In other words, if women spend more time on some activities, then they have to reduce the time
for other activities.
For the other control variables, we use the wife￿ s nonlabor income in the previous year and
the sum of her husband￿ s labor and nonlabor income in the previous year. These variables may
have an in￿ uence on the time use of married women. Researchers have used household charac-
teristics as proxies for the degree of household responsibility to test the household responsibility
hypothesis (HRH). Similarly to previous research, we include the number of children younger
than seven years (child 0 ￿ 6) and the number of children aged 7 ￿ 12 years (child 7 ￿ 12). If
working mothers have the greater share of childcare in the household, these variables decrease
commute time with an increase in the time spent on housework.
Lee and McDonald (2003) also include the presence in the household of parents or parents-
in-law who are older than 59 years. They assume that living with parents or parents-in-law
may reduce the household responsibilities of married women because they help with childcare,
housecleaning, meal preparation, etc. In fact, Lee and McDonald (2003) ￿nd that this variable
increases their commute time. Ueda (2005) also include the presence in the household of the
wife￿ s or husband￿ s mother at an age of 64 years or younger. However, this estimates a housework
time equation, not the commute time equation. In the explanatory variables, Ueda (2005) also
includes the presence in the household of other parents, arguing that living with other parents
2Solberg and Wong (1992) use Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) to estimate the time-use equations.
Unfortunately, we cannot use SUR because the covariance matrix of the errors is singular.
10may actually increase housework time in taking care of them, e.g., assisting them to eat or use
the bathroom. In this paper, we include the presence in the household of the parents or parents-
in-law at an age of 64 years or younger (parents), the presence in the household of parents or
parents-in-law who are older than 64 years (parents 65), and the presence in the household of
the wife￿ s or husband￿ s grandparents (grandparent). Lastly, three geographical categories are
included, comprising 13 major cities in Japan (large city), all other cities (middle city), and
towns and villages (small city).
We estimate each time-use equation using the IV method. IV will overcome a potential endo-
geneity problem: wage rates are determined in the labor market.3 We use dummy variables for
the number of employees, the wife￿ s occupation, and the industry of employment as instruments
for wage rates. Table 1 provides detailed information on these variables. We also include the
wife￿ s age, tenure in the current job, and tenure squared as instruments.4
3.2 Estimation results
Table 3 provides the OLS estimation results, and Table 4 details the IV estimation results.5
Although Table 4 shows that the Cragg￿ Donald F-statistic is smaller than the Stock￿ Yogo
weak identi￿cation test critical values, the IV method reduces the negative bias of wage rates
in the OLS estimation, as explained below. Before discussing the e⁄ect of wage rates on the
time-use equations, we brie￿ y refer to another control variable. From both Tables 3 and 4, we
￿nd that having a child aged 0 ￿ 6 has a signi￿cant e⁄ect on the time allocation of married
women. As the number of preschool-age children increases, greater household responsibilities
result in shorter commute times and longer work times at home. These ￿ndings are intuitive but
important. The literature (Madden 1981, Lee and McDonald 2003, Turner and Niemeier 1997)
has shown that married women￿ s commuting is in￿ uenced by the presence of children because
of household responsibilities. However, they do not con￿rm whether the presence of children
increases housework time because their data does not include housework time. In contrast, the
3The other consideration is that our empirical model has a potential measurement error problem in that
respondents do not always accurately report their wage rates. The IV method also solves this problem.
4The estimation results for the wage rate and its square are reported in the Appendix.
5We do not report the estimation results of the time spent in leisure, the remainder of Eq. (2), because we
can calculate the coe¢ cient of leisure by using the value of the estimated coe¢ cients from other equations.
11linkage between commuting time, housework time, and the presence of children in our study is
clear. We also ￿nd that preschool-age children decrease married women￿ s working time in the
market. No other variables related to HRH have any e⁄ect on the time-use equations. Both
the wives￿unearned income and the husbands￿income also have insigni￿cant e⁄ects on time
allocation. The middle city dummies are all insigni￿cant. The OLS and IV results show that
small city dummies have a signi￿cant impact on housework time. Married women who reside in
a small city have shorter housework times than those who reside in a large city.
Our estimation results in Tables 3 and 4 obtain a backward-bending labor supply curve.
However, the coe¢ cient for wage squared in Table 3 is insigni￿cant, whereas that in Table 4 is
signi￿cant. The results suggest the importance of controlling for wage rates using the IV method.
The sign of wage rates and their squares on the time spent on commuting and housework are
important for our argument. As expected, the wage rate has a signi￿cant and positive impact and
the square of the wage rate has a signi￿cant and negative impact on commute time.6 Therefore,
the estimation result shows that the commute time of married women follows a backward-
bending pattern with respect to their wage rates. In contrast, an increase in wages decreases
married women￿ s home production times at an increasing rate. This implies that housework
time follows a C-shaped pattern. Combining these results shows that married women with
either low or high wage rates locate their residences near their job locations and have long
housework times. On the other hand, married women with wage rates between these extremes
choose longer commutes because they do not have su¢ cient wages to move to the new location.
As a result, their housework times become shorter.
Comparing Table 3 with Table 4 shows that the absolute estimated value of wage and wage
squared in Table 4 is larger than in Table 3. This suggests that OLS underestimates the e⁄ect
of the wage rate on the time-use allocation compared with the IV method. Figure 2 shows the
relationship between commuting time and wage rates for married women who reside in a large
city with a child. We also set that they have no unearned income but that their husband has
the average total income. The empirical result using IV shows that commute time peaks at
6Figure 1 reveals that there are only two respondents who earn more than 400,000 yen and only one respondent
who commutes more than 250 minutes. The OLS and IV estimation results both support the hypothesis of a
backward-bending commute time even when we drop these three observations.
12approximately 250,000 yen, while OLS results provide a peak at about 350,000 yen.
Using the IV results, Figure 3 shows the portion of daytime hours devoted to commuting,
housework, market work, and leisure. Once again, commute time ￿rst increases, and then
decreases, with respect to wage rates. When the married women earns a low wage (100,000
yen), the fraction of time spent on housework is 22.5%. This drops until 250,000 yen, before
increasing again.
4 Conclusion
The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between the commute times of married
women with household responsibilities and their wage rates. The analysis di⁄ers from previous
work because the times spent on commuting and housework are simultaneously determined in
both the theoretical and empirical models.
Previous research emphasizes that married women tend to have short commutes because of
low wages and high household responsibilities. In the theoretical part of the paper, however,
we show that there is a case where wives￿commute times follow a backward-bending pattern
with respect to wage rates. We also show a tradeo⁄between commute time and housework time
in relation to wage rates. Married women with lower-wage jobs choose short commutes and
have longer housework times. Because higher wage rates o⁄set the e⁄ects of a long commute,
wives will choose a long commute when o⁄ered higher-wage jobs. In this case, their housework
time decreases because it is more e¢ cient to work in the market than at home. Married women
further reduce their housework times in this case because a long time spent commuting reduces
energy for housework. However, married women with even higher-wage jobs also choose short
commutes. This is because they move to closer to their workplaces: with a higher wage rate,
there is a higher opportunity cost of commuting. In this case, they save time to do domestic
chores. Empirical results using OLS and IV and a sample of married women working full time
from the 1993 JPSC support our theoretical predictions. The results also support the HRH for
the number of small children. That is to say, as in previous studies, the number of preschool-age
children reduces wives￿commute times and substantially increases their housework times.
13We note several other considerations in the paper. First, in our study the behavior of
husbands is a black box. In the theoretical part, we implicitly assume that married women￿ s
bargaining power in a household increases when their wage rates increase. The e⁄ect of this
bargaining power would be better captured if we constructed a bargaining model. Our empirical
results also show that relatively high-wage earners can engage in long housework times and have
short commutes. This suggests that while Japanese husbands do not help with domestic duties,
they may still have a role in determining the location of the family residence. We could con￿rm
this if we included information on husbands. Second, we do not draw any policy implications
because neither the theoretical model nor the empirical model includes any policy parameters.
As mentioned in the theoretical part, Japanese ￿rms and government o¢ ces often reimburse
employees for the cost of commuting. This is because commuting costs are tax deductible in the
Japanese tax system (Yamaga 2000). In this tax system, the decisions of wives will be distorted
towards long commutes (option 2 in our theoretical model). As a result, their housework times
will decline. This policy context is left for future research. Third, as mentioned in the empirical
section, we do not use panel data, even though it is available. However, panel data is more
suitable for understanding dynamic decisions regarding workplaces and residences. To address
this, we will use the panel data in our future research.
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Commute Commute time, minutes.
Housework Housework time, minutes.
Market Market work time, minutes.
Leisure Leisure time, minutes. Various subtime categories, e.g., studying, sleep-
ing, eating, are aggregated into leisure time.
Wage Monthly salary rate, yen.
Wage squared Square of monthly salary divided by 10,000.
Unearned income 1992 nonlabor income, 1992 10,000 yen.
Husband￿ s income 1992 husband￿ s total income, 1992 10,000 yen.
Child 0￿ 6 The number of children aged 0￿ 6.
Child 7￿ 12 The number of children aged 7￿ 12.
Parents Dummy variable for living with parents or parents-in-law aged 64 years
or younger.
Parents 65 Dummy variable for living with parents or parents-in-law aged 65 years
or older.
Grandparent Dummy variable for living with grandparents.
Large city Dummy variable for having a residence in a large city (reference).
Middle city Dummy variable for having a residence in a middle city.
Small city Dummy variable for having a residence in a small city.
Emp. 1 Dummy variable for 1￿ 99 employees (reference).
Emp. 2 Dummy variable for 100￿ 499 employees.
Emp. 3 Dummy variable for 500￿ 999 employees.
Emp. 4 Dummy variable for 1000 or more employees. The number of employees
in government and municipal o¢ ces is included in this category.
Professional Dummy variable for a respondent who is a professional worker.
Technical Dummy variable for a respondent who is a technical worker.
Other occ. Dummy variable for a respondent who works in another occupation (ref-
erence).
Fin. and pub. Dummy variable for a respondent who works in a ￿nance company or
the public service.
Others ind. Dummy variable for a respondent who works in another industry (refer-
ence).
Age Age of the respondent, years.
Tenure Tenure of current job, years.
Tenure squared Square of tenure of current job.Table 2
Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Commute 50.63 49.81 0 280
Housework 224.69 136.72 0 780
Market 495.39 77.16 60 660
Leisure 669.30 112.15 360 1030
Wage 201.16 75.29 50 500
Wage squared 460.88 360.33 25 2500
Unearned income 2.33 15.61 0 150
Husband￿ s income 439.38 147.65 140 1000
Child 0￿ 6 0.86 0.88 0 3
Child 7￿ 12 0.38 0.64 0 2
Parents 0.45 0.50 0 1
Parents 65 0.14 0.35 0 1
Grandparent 0.10 0.30 0 1
Large city 0.20 0.40 0 1
Middle city 0.50 0.50 0 1
Small city 0.30 0.46 0 1
Emp. 1 0.38 0.49 0 1
Emp. 2 0.13 0.33 0 1
Emp. 3 0.04 0.19 0 1
Emp. 4 0.46 0.50 0 1
Professional 0.15 0.36 0 1
Technical 0.16 0.36 0 1
Other occ. 0.70 0.46 0 1
Fin. and pub. 0.14 0.35 0 1
Others ind. 0.86 0.35 0 1
Age 30.09 3.10 24 34
Tenure 6.16 3.97 0 16
Tenure squared 53.60 55.40 0 256
Observations 128
Wage squared is divided by 100.Table 3
OLS estimation
Commute Housework Market
Variable Coe⁄. Std. Err. Coe⁄. Std. Err. Coe⁄. Std. Err.
Wage 0.5821￿￿￿ 0.1693 ￿ 1.5571￿￿ 0.7111 1.0273￿￿ 0.4964
Wage squared ￿ 0.0008￿￿ 0.0003 0.0028￿￿ 0.0014 ￿ 0.0015 0.0009
Unearned income ￿ 0.1356 0.1256 0.0633 0.4300 ￿ 0.2616 0.3401
Husband￿ s income 0.0242 0.0359 ￿ 0.0794 0.0838 ￿ 0.0631 0.0522
Child 0￿ 6 ￿ 9.5725￿￿ 4.5259 87.8656￿￿￿ 13.7797 ￿ 22.0667￿￿ 10.4753
Child 7￿ 12 ￿ 0.5265 6.8676 ￿ 21.6006 15.5577 8.1604 9.8008
Parents ￿ 6.2840 9.0969 1.1604 20.5596 ￿ 9.4439 11.6558
Parents 65 ￿ 11.0340 12.1971 15.1700 27.6631 25.1923￿ 14.5205
Grandparent ￿ 10.5952 10.8732 ￿ 11.5327 27.2139 3.9713 13.3152
Middle city ￿ 10.0329 14.7601 8.1506 22.9800 ￿ 18.5007 16.2797
Small city ￿ 23.8530 14.4365 ￿ 60.4679￿￿ 28.0571 10.8423 17.9324
Const. ￿ 13.6534 33.1090 391.1080￿￿￿ 104.3062 407.5050￿￿￿ 63.9540
Adj-R2 0.2778 0.3882 0.3114
Observations 128 128 128
Std. Err. represents robust standard errors.
￿￿￿ indicates signi￿cant at 1%.
￿￿ indicates signi￿cant at 5%.
￿ indicates signi￿cant at 10%.Table 4
IV estimation
Commute Housework Market
Variable Coe⁄. Std. Err. Coe⁄. Std. Err. Coe⁄. Std. Err.
Wage 1.1290￿￿ 0.5083 ￿ 2.2232￿ 1.1634 1.7975￿￿￿ 0.6762
Wage squared ￿ 0.0021￿ 0.0011 0.0043￿ 0.0026 ￿ 0.0032￿￿ 0.0015
Unearned income ￿ 0.1316 0.1447 0.0779 0.4628 ￿ 0.2144 0.3601
Husband￿ s income 0.0419 0.0335 ￿ 0.1041 0.0887 ￿ 0.0449 0.0583
Child 0￿ 6 ￿ 9.0748￿￿ 4.5610 87.4667￿￿￿ 12.4630 ￿ 20.9246￿￿ 8.6547
Child 7￿ 12 ￿ 0.1982 6.6802 ￿ 22.0423 15.3410 8.5337 9.6936
Parents ￿ 9.7027 8.0865 5.7089 19.8580 ￿ 13.4397 11.6732
Parents 65 ￿ 12.9638 11.3328 17.5603 25.9094 22.5593 14.2868
Grandparent ￿ 11.6638 11.2455 ￿ 10.6510 26.6602 1.5729 13.9821
Middle city ￿ 9.8786 14.3764 9.2778 24.8479 ￿ 15.4837 16.6575
Small city ￿ 21.5503 14.4443 ￿ 62.8158￿￿ 28.1083 15.0575 18.8155
Const. ￿ 72.7057 54.5802 460.9202￿￿￿ 140.8516 319.8450￿￿￿ 74.4546
Centered R2 0.2200 0.3755 0.2710
Observations 128 128 128
Std. Err. represents robust standard errors.
(Cragg￿ Donald Wald F statistic) 1:91 < 10:43 (Stock￿ Yogo weak ID test 10% critical values)
￿￿￿ indicates signi￿cant at 1%.
￿￿ indicates signi￿cant at 5%.
￿ indicates signi￿cant at 10%.Appendix
Table 5
Wage and wage squared estimation
Wage Wage squared
Variable Coe⁄. Std.Err. Coe⁄. Std. Err.
Unearned income ￿ 0.7845￿￿￿ 0.2390 ￿ 0.3893￿￿￿ 0.1473
Husband￿ s income 0.0737 0.0474 0.0391￿ 0.0203
Child 0￿ 6 ￿ 16.9732￿￿ 6.5734 ￿ 7.4221￿￿ 3.0275
Child 7￿ 12 9.0298 8.6241 4.0782 3.7597
Parents ￿ 16.4509 11.4033 ￿ 9.3653￿ 5.5138
Parents 65 7.9293 16.4207 3.2671 7.5638
Grandparent 20.9679 18.1974 8.3183 8.1048
Middle city ￿ 38.7207￿￿ 16.5592 ￿ 15.3712￿ 8.1188
Small city ￿ 27.3807 22.1833 ￿ 9.5967 12.1030
Emp. 2 9.2300 14.1856 0.2000 5.9522
Emp. 3 60.6924￿ 34.9957 31.2015 19.7711
Emp. 4 20.0088 13.1696 4.4973 6.3871
Professional 45.2951￿￿￿ 14.7572 16.2659￿￿ 6.5760
Technical 63.6022￿￿￿ 15.4821 26.8465￿￿￿ 7.8466
Fin. and pub. 62.3157￿￿ 23.9369 34.1575￿￿ 13.8356
Age 1.1605 2.1400 1.0801 1.0670
Tenure 8.4972 5.3757 4.8979￿ 2.8865
Tenure squared ￿ 0.3805 0.4116 ￿ 0.2818 0.2297
Const. 108.5934￿ 62.7480 ￿ 14.1246 33.2427
Centered R2 0.4374 0.3990
Observations 128 128
Std. Err. represents robust standard errors.
Wage squared is divided by 1000.
￿￿￿ indicates signi￿cant at 1%.
￿￿ indicates signi￿cant at 5%.
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Figure 3. Time allocation 
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